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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
STATK OF UTAH, ] 
Plaint iIf/Appellee, 
\ ; ] 
,,1'IMMi I.IJOY'I RAVFfl^ ] 
Defendant/Appellant. ' 
C d t-it-"' 1 I" i ,, ' I " i" " A 
1 Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
De-f~* - Cravens access nis conviction for 
Threatening ^.LL;, ui ^o..^ ^ angerous v* <: i I inhi 
Class v . Q-i^rnear]CT :;*iah Code An: it LC-^06 (19^2) and Threat 
Age- - . " Misdemeanor, Utah Code Ann, 
§ "6-5-107 . ieti entered ;_ -.:_., -i.. _ 
and for Sal" Lake Co^r/ v. State of Utah r.r e 'honorable RCDII; W. 
Reese pres T irisdiction under 
Utah Code An:; - i . a < •; *- _-_*•_ . 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
The issues presented for review are as tollows 
:i . Whether the court erred in allowing the prosecution to 
inquire about tl le Deiendanl lr rimln^l history simply because he 
was wearing a jumpsuit from the Utah State Prison di In. Uin II 
t :i i a 1 
Standaid 'i Rewto" Hi t jiHianl ul M^view is -.- abuse of 
discretion, but the trial judge must sc;up^-.~s^y ^Kamhu- \ \w 
in iinlHT" t n properly exercise discretion, State v. 
Decorso, 370 Utah Aav . kep. "" 'Utah 1999); this opinion, chained 
the standard of review found in State v. Doporto. 935 P.2d 484 
(Utah 1997). 
2. Whether the court erred in allowing defendant to wear a 
Utah State Prison jumpsuit at his bench trial without obtaining a 
waiver of his right to stand trial in street clothes. 
The standard of review: The trial judge must inquire as to 
why the "defendant is appearing in prison clothes, even in the 
absence of defense objection. Absent such an inquiry and a 
reasoned determination that such an appearance is necessary, 
automatic reversal is the consequence." State v. Bennett. 2000 
UT 25 at f 2 & f 3. 
3. Whether there was sufficient evidence to find Mr. 
Cravens guilty of Threatening With or Using of Dangerous Weapon 
In Fight or Quarrel, a class A Misdemeanor and Threat Against 
Life or Property, a class B Misdemeanor. 
Standard of Review: The court may reverse a decision only 
when evidence is so inconclusive or so inherently improbable that 
reasonable minds must have entered a reasonable doubt the 
defendant committed the crime. State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443 
(Utah 1983). The Court should "review the evidence and all 
inferences which any reasonably be drawn from it in the light 
most favorable to the verdict of the jury." Petree, 659 P.2d at 
444. 
PRESERVATION OF ARGUMENT 
The issue concerning the prosecutor's ability to ask 
defendant about his criminal history is preserved in R. 52:27-29. 
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(Transcript of bench trial is found at court record 52). 
The issue of whether defendant has a right to trial street 
clothes rather than prison garb may be visited for the first time 
upon appeal under the plain error doctrine. Pursuant to Rule 
103(d) of the Utah Rules of Evidence, this Court may take "notice 
of plain errors affecting substantial rights although they were 
not brought to the attention of the court." See also. State v. 
Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29, cert. denied 493 U.S. 814, 110 S.Ct. 62, 
107 L.Ed.2d 29 (1989). To establish plain error, the appellant 
must show that "(i) [a]n error exists; (ii) the error should have 
been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful," 
i.e., the error affects a substantive right of the accused. 
State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993). See also 
Eldredge, 773 P.2d at 35. 
The trial judge must inquire as to why the "defendant is 
appearing in prison clothes, even in the absence of defense 
objection. Absent such an inquiry and a reasoned determination 
that such an appearance is necessary, automatic reversal is the 
consequence." State v. Bennett, 2000 UT 25 at %2 & 13; See also. 
Chess v. Smith, 617 P.2d 341 (Utah 1980). The prosecution 
presented only one witness against Cravens. The prosecution had 
no physical evidence, no confession and presented only one 
witness. The trial was a classic battle of "he said-she said", 
and as Judge Reese stated "So the large question in my mind is 
who do I believe in this case" R. 52:45. Consequently, the 
credibility of witnesses was very important. Without Craven$' 
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criminal history, the trial court had no reason to discount his 
testimony. If Cravens1 criminal history was kept out the trial 
court would have little reason to believe Ms. Dominguez, who is 
the only witness against defendant, over Cravens. Absent that 
error the likelihood of a different outcome is high. 
The issue of whether there is sufficient evidence for a 
conviction is preserved in defendant's motion for directed 
verdict at R. 52:17 & 18. 
STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The following statutes, rules, and constitutional provisions 
relevant to a determination in this matter, and are set forth in 
Addendum B: Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-102 (1983) 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-107 (Supp. 1988) 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-506 (Supp. 1992) 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2A-3(2) (1996) 
Utah Rules of Evidence 403 (Supp. 1998) 
Utah Rules of Evidence 404(b) (Supp. 1998) 
Utah Rules of Evidence 609 
Utah Rules of Evidence 103 (d) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On December 17, 1997 defendant was charged with threatening 
with or using dangerous weapon in fight or quarrel, a class A 
misdemeanor in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-506 (Supp. 
1992) and threat against life or property, a class B misdemeanor 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-107 (Supp. 1988). R. 52:44 
& 46. The defendant, Cravens, fought these charges at a bench 
trial held on September 8, 1999. The prosecutor during cross-
examination of Cravens asked questions concerning his criminal 
history. R. 52:27-29. Defense counsel objected to the 
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questions. R. 52:27 & 28. The prosecutor had no knowledge of 
defendant's criminal history and was simply asking questions 
about his criminal history because he was at his bench trial 
wearing a bright orange jumpsuit, which was clearly marked with 
the label "Utah State Prison" stenciled in block letters. R. 
52:27 & 28. The defendant was found guilty. R. 52:44 & 46. 
Cravens was sentenced to 3 65 days concurrent on count I and 18 0 
days consecutive on count II. R. 36. Cravens appeals from the 
final judgment. He is currently incarcerated. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On December 17, 1997, Salt Lake City Police responded to an 
alleged family fight at 1882 South West Temple in Salt Lake 
County. R. 52:6 & 7. Upon arrival, the officers determined that 
the suspect, Mr. Cravens, had left the scene; consequently, he 
never related his version of events to the police. R. 52:38. 
Diane Dominguez stated that on the day in question she was 
staying at the her apartment Rita Cravens and with several other 
women. R. 52:10. Mr. Cravens, the Defendant, came over to the 
apartment carrying an eighteen inch club and demanded she come 
out with him. R. 52:10. Ms. Dominquez stated that Mr. Cravens 
became angry and threatened to injure all of the ladies in the 
apartment. R. 52:9 & 11. Ms. Dominquez called 911. R. 52:10 
&11. Ms. Dominquez testified that Mr. Cravens pushed Rita 
Cravens against a wall and threatened Rita Cravens with the club. 
R.52:35. 
Mr. Cravens testified that he went over to the apartment as 
5 
a result of events that took place earlier in the day. R. 52:23 & 
24. Mr. Cravens indicated that a fight between Rita Cravens and 
Mr. Cravens' new girlfriend took place just before the present 
incident. R. 52:23 & 24. Mr. Cravens argued that he was at the 
apartment just to have a conversation with Rita Cravens. R. 
52:24 & 25. He denies having a club or stick in his hand. R. 
52:25. 
On September 8, 1999 a bench trial was held before the 
Honorable Robin W. Reese. The only witness against Mr. Cravens 
was Diane Dominguez. R. 52:6-16,32-38. Mr. Cravens testified in 
his defense. R. 52:20-29. The bench trial turned into a classic 
battle between "he said-she said". Consequently, credibility of 
the witnesses was of monumental importance to the outcome of the 
trial. The credibility of Mr. Cravens was directly at issue when 
the prosecutor questioned him about his criminal history. The 
relevant portion of the bench trial was as follows: 
Q Mr. Cravens, are you currently in prison? 
A Yes, I am. 
Q What are you convicted of? 
MR. SIMMS: Relevance, your honor. 
THE COURT: It wouldn't have any relevance unless it's 
either a felony in the last ten years or a crime involving 
dishonesty or false statements so. 
MS. COLLINS: Yeah, what's-
MR. SIMMS: Do you have copies of any convictions that you're 
going to use or -
MS. COLLINS: No, we're just going to ask for the felony. 
See what kind of felony he's got (inaudible). I believe 
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that if he's not convict of any felonies. 
THE COURT : I think you have a good faith basis, counselor. 
You can't just go on a fishing expedition. If you have a 
good faith reason to ask Mr. Cravens about convictions of 
either of those categories, I'd permit it but otherwise you 
can* t. 
MS. COLLINS: Okay. Can I have just a minute, please, your 
honor? 
THE COURT: All right. 
MS. COLLINS: Your Honor, the fact that Mr. Cravens appeared 
today in prison uniform that we can basically make the 
presumption that he has at least a felony conviction here. 
MR. SIMMS: Judge, you may take judicial notice that he's in 
prison gear but I don't think that has any probative value, 
I mean, on this case whether he committed this crime or not, 
whether he's in prison garb or not. 
THE COURT: Whether he is in prison is not admissible. That 
evidence wouldn't be relevant. But if he'd been convicted 
of a felony it may. I suppose there's a possibility he's in 
prison but on a Class A misdemeanor. A person who is 
ordered to serve a year's commitment can opt to serve that 
time in prison. But the fact he is in prison I think would 
establish a good faith basis so if you want to ask about 
felony convictions, I'll permit it. 
Q (Questioning by Ms. Collins resumes) Mr. Cravens, have 
you ever been convicted of a felony? 
A Yes, I have. 
Q What are they? 
A I'm in prison right now for (inaudible). 
THE COURT: I couldn't hear you, I'm sorry. 
A I'm in prison right now for burglary. 
Q Okay. Anything else? 
A Yes. I was convicted in 1980 for armed robbery. 
THE COURT: I won't require you to answer to about any 
charges prior to the past ten years. 
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Q Is there anything more recent than that? 
A No. 
R. 52:27-29. 
The prosecution had neither certified copies of convictions 
nor a criminal history of the defendant. R. 52:27 & 28. 
Nevertheless, Mr. Cravens was asked about previous criminal 
convictions. R. 52:27 & 29. The prosecutor was asking about the 
defendant's criminal history because he was an inmate at the Utah 
State Prison and in prison clothes. R. 52:28. Defendant admitted 
to several prior convictions. R. 52:29. 
Mr. Cravens was convicted on both counts: class A 
Misdemeanor, Threatening with or Using of Dangerous Weapon in 
Fight or Quarrel and class B Misdemeanor, Threat Against Life or 
Property. R. 52:46;Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-506 (Supp. 1992) & Utah 
Code Ann. §76-5-107 (Supp. 1988), respectively. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The Court erred in allowing the prosecution to ask the 
defendant about his criminal history without a good faith basis. 
The prosecution asked the defendant about his history simply 
because he was wearing a Utah State Prison jumpsuit. 
2. Allowing the defendant to wear a Utah State Prison 
jumpsuit without inquiring as to why he is wearing such gear is 
prejudicial and violates his due process rights absent an 
explicit waiver even at a bench trial. 
3. Only one out of a possible six eyewitnesses testified 
against defendant. There is no physical evidence and no 
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confession. There is insufficient evidence to convict. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1. THE COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE PROSECUTION TO INQUIRE 
ABOUT THE DEFENDANT'S CRIMINAL HISTORY SIMPLY BECAUSE 
HE WAS WEARING A UTAH STATE PRISON JUMPSUIT AT HIS 
BENCH TRIAL 
The court erred in allowing the prosecutor to ask about 
defendant's prior bad acts. The prosecution had neither 
certified copies of convictions nor defendant's criminal history 
and was merely asking about the defendant's criminal history 
because he was dressed in prison clothes. 
Rule 609, Utah Rules of Evidence: 
(a) General rule. For the purpose of attacking the 
credibility of a witness, 
(1) evidence that a witness other than the 
accused has been convicted of a crime shall be 
admitted, subject to Rule 403, if the crime was 
punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of 
one year under the law which the witness was 
convicted, and evidence that an accused has been 
convicted of such crime shall be admitted if the 
court determines that the probative value of 
admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial 
effect to the accused; and 
(2) evidence that any witness has been 
convicted of a crime shall be admitted if it 
involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless 
of the punishment. 
Under 609 "[e]vidence of prior crimes is presumed 
prejudicial and, absent a reason for the admission of evidence 
other than to show criminal disposition, the evidence is 
excluded. State v. Saunders, 699 P.2d 738 (Utah 1985). 
The court must engage in a balancing test under 609(a)(1) to 
determine if a prior conviction is admissible. State v. Banner, 
717 P.2d 1325 (Utah 1986). 
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Factors to be considered when balancing probative value 
against prejudicial effect pursuant to Subdivision (a)(1) 
include: 
(1) The nature of the crime, as bearing on the 
character for veracity of the witness; (2) the 
recentness or remoteness of the prior 
conviction; (3) the similarity of the prior 
crime to the charged crime, insofar as a close 
resemblance may lead the jury to punish the 
accused as a bad person;(4) the importance of 
credibility issues in determining the truth in 
a prosecution tried without decisive 
nontestimonial evidence; (5) the importance of 
the accused's testimony, as perhaps warranting 
the exclusion of convictions probative of the 
accused character for veracity. 
State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325 at 1334 (Utah 1986); State v. 
Gentry, 747 P.2d 1032 (Utah 1987). 
The trial court must balance the probative value of the 
evidence against its prejudicial effect. Salt Lake City v. 
HojLtman, 806 P.2d 235 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
In the present case, the trial judge did not perform the 
balancing test required by U.R.E. 609(a)(1) and Banner. The 
trial judge's failure to perform the required balancing test is 
evident since the judge did not know the nature of the prior 
convictions before making his ruling that they were admissible. 
Moreover, the trial judge appeared to misapprehend the relevant 
inquiry since he focused on whether the convictions were for 
felonies and more than ten years old rather on the Banner 
balancing test. 
Applying the Banner criteria to this case demonstrates that 
the prior convictions were not admissible under 609(a)(1). As to 
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factor one, burglary and robbery do not have a bearing on the 
veracity of a witness. State v. Lanier, 778 P.2d 9 (Utah 1989) . 
Second, the state did not establish the age of burglary 
conviction and robbery conviction was very old (1980). The late 
date of offense and the lack of a date on the burglary works 
against admission. Third, the prior crimes are not similar, but 
are more serious. There is a tendency to punish for being a bad 
person rather than for committing a new crime. Fourth, 
credibility was critical to this case. Finally, the defendant's 
testimony critical to case. Defendant argued that his actions 
were in self-defense, which would have been more persuasive if 
his prior crimes had not be admitted. 
All of the Banner factors weigh against admission of the 
prior crimes in this case and establish that the prior crime 
evidence had no probative value. Due to the highly prejudicial 
nature of this evidence, the trial court erred in admitting it 
under 609(a)(1). 
The evidence is also not admissible under Utah Rules of 
Evidence 609 (a)(2). Robbery and burglary "are not crimes of 
"dishonesty or false statement' within the meaning of U.R.E. 
609(a)(2), unless, as we cautioned in Bruce, "they were committed 
by fraudulent or deceitful means bearing directly on the 
accused's likelihood to testify truthfully." State v. Lanier, 
778 P.2d 9 at 11 (Utah 1989)(prejudicial error to admit burglary 
and robbery convictions); State v. Bruce, 779P.2d 646 (Utah 
1989). There was no evidence presented that the robbery and 
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burglary were committed by fraudulent or deceitful means. R. 
52:29. 
The trial court improperly allowed the state to question 
defendant about his prior convictions. Although the trial court 
did not allow the prosecutor to pry further into defendant's 1980 
robbery conviction, both that conviction and the dateless 
conviction for burglary were improperly admitted into evidence. 
R. 52:29. 
The error was prejudicial since there is a reasonable 
likelihood of a more favorable outcome if the convictions were 
not admitted. The defendant is prejudiced when irrelevant 
criminal history comes in. Bringing in his prior record only 
serves to make him look like a bad person, who is more likely to 
commit another crime. 
The State's case was far from overwhelming. The prosecution 
had no physical evidence and no confession The prosecution 
presented only one witness against Cravens. The trial was a 
classic battle of "he said-she said";consequently, the 
credibility of witnesses was very important. Without Cravens' 
criminal history, the trial court had no reason to discount his 
testimony. If Cravens' criminal history was kept out the trial 
court would have little reason to believe another witness over 
Cravens. Absent that error the likelihood of a different outcome 
is high. 
Additionally, the evidence of prior convictions was not 
admissible under Utah Rules of Evidence 404 (b). 
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Utah Rules of Evidence 4 04 (b) analysis requires that (1) 
proponent of the evidence must initially demonstrate that the 
evidence is offered for a proper non-character purpose; (2) court 
must determine whether the evidence is relevant for a non-
character purpose, i.e. the evidence must prove some non-
character fact material to the crime charged, other than 
propensity; and (3) trial court must decide whether the evidence 
is admissible under Utah Rules of Evidence 403. State v. 
Decorso, 370 Utah Adv. Rep. 11 (Utah 1999). 
Consequently, the prosecution can not go on a "fishing 
expedition" in hopes of finding admissible evidence. 
In this case, the state did not demonstrate that the 
evidence was offered for a non-character purpose. In fact, there 
is no non-character use to this evidence. Accordingly, it was 
improperly admitted. Moreover, it was more prejudicial that 
probative and therefore inadmissible under URE 403. The prior 
convictions had little if any probative value and substantially 
outweighed by their prejudicial nature. 
The defendant on the stand admitted to a conviction in "1980 
for armed robbery" and burglary. R. 52:29. At a bench trial 
consisting of "he said-she said" testimony credibility is very 
important. When impermissible evidence comes out it has an 
impact. Consequently, the court should not have allowed the 
prosecutor to ask questions about the defendant's criminal 
history. This error was prejudicial and requires a new trial. 
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POINT 2 DEFENDANT WEARING A UTAH PRISON JUMPSUIT IS PREJUDICIAL 
AND VIOLATES DEFENDANT'S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS 
It is prejudicial and violates the defendant's due process 
rights to wear a jail jumpsuit at a jury trial. State v. 
Bennett, 2000 UT 25. In Bennett, a defendant was forced to sit 
through one day of a jury trial in a jail jumpsuit, which was 
"clearly marked with the label "Tooele County Jail1" State v. 
Bennett, 2000 UT 25 at %2. 
In Chess v. Smith, 617 P.2d 341, 344 (Utah 1980), this court 
held that a defendant is entitled to appear at trial in 
civilian clothing unless the defendant affirmatively waives 
that right. We stated, "The prejudicial effect that flows 
from a defendant's appearing before a jury in identifiable 
prison garb is not measurable, and it is so potentially 
prejudicial as to crate a substantial risk of fundamental 
unfairness in a criminal trial." JEd. We further held that 
"a trial judge should on his own initiative inquire of a 
defendant whether he wishes to waive his right not to appear 
in prison clothes so that the record affirmatively shows an 
intelligent and conscious waiver by the defendant if the 
defendant chooses to stand trial in prison clothes." JEd. at 
345. 
State v. Bennett, 2000 UT 25 at if3. 
Although, the present case involves a bench trial the same 
prejudicial effect that impacts a jury may impact a judge. In 
fact, in this case the prejudicial impact is evident since the 
judge allowed the prosecution to dig into the defendant's 
criminal history simply because he was wearing prison garb. 
The standard of review is basic. The trial judge must 
inquire as to why the "defendant is appearing in prison clothes, 
even in the absence of defense objection. Absent such an inquiry 
and a reasoned determination that such an appearance is 
necessary, automatic reversal is the consequence." State v. 
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Bennett, 2000 UT 25 at f7. 
Consequently, it is prejudicial as well as violative of the 
defendant's due process rights to face a bench trial in prison 
clothes. 
POINT 3 THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO FIND DEFENDANT 
GUILTY. 
There was insufficient evidence to find Mr. Cravens guilty 
of threatening with or using of dangerous weapon in fight or 
quarrel, a class A misdemeanor and threat against life or 
property, a class B misdemeanor. 
The State provided only one witness, Ms Dominguez. R. at 6. 
There were at least six other eyewitnesses, but none of those 
people testified. R. 52:10. In addition, the police who arrived 
on the scene did not testify. See R. 52. Police contacted 
people at the scene. Mr. Cravens, had left the scene; 
consequently, he never related his version of events to the 
police. R. 52:38. There is no physical evidence. See R. 52. 
There is no admission by Cravens. See R. 52. 
Ms. Dominquez was the sole witness against Cravens. Ms. 
Dominquez admitted to disliking Cravens. R. 52:16. The 
marshaled evidence in support of the conviction was: 
1) Ms. Dominguez's testimony that Mr. Cravens had a 
club. R. 52:9. 
2) Ms. Dominguez's testimony that Mr. Cravens 
threatened people inside the apartment. R. 52:09. 
3) Assuming this Court thinks Mr. Cravens' prior 
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convictions were relevant, Cravens1 statements concerning his 
criminal history. 52:29. 
Standard of Review: The court may reverse a decision only 
when evidence is so inconclusive or so inherently improbable that 
reasonable minds must have entered a reasonable doubt the 
defendant committed the crime. State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443 
(Utah 1983) . The Court should "review the evidence and all 
inferences which any reasonably be drawn from it in the light 
most favorable to the verdict of the jury." Petree, 659 P.2d at 
444 . 
Just as in Petree, the charges against Cravens require a 
mens rea of "intentional". JEd. Threats against life or property 
requires that the defendant act with "intent". Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-5-107 (1988) . Threatening with or using dangerous weapon in 
fight or quarrel does not include a mental state requirement. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-506 (1992). Consequently, under Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-2-102 (1983) the default mental state is "intent, 
knowledge or recklessness". Mental state is often difficult to 
prove and given the weak evidence presented against Cravens, it 
is clear that the prosecution has not marshaled enough evidence 
against Cravens to merit a conviction. 
CONCLUSION 
The judgment should be reversed for the reasons set forth 
herein. 
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SUBMITTED this a day of March, 2000 
CLAYTON AP^SIMMS 
Attorney"ror Defendant/Appellant 
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delivered the original and seven of the foregoing to the Utah 
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Delivered this day of March 2 000. 
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ADDENDUM A 
CITY/STATE Plaintiff, 
-VS-
Q V \ A/WWVM ^ ()f\ A A>U\yi 
(J \J Defendant 
DOB: 
p0Urt;-Ste!OTtJtah 
ALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, DIVISION II 
ast,:Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
SENTENCE/JUDGMENT/ORDER 
Criminal/Traffic 
Case Number _ 
Tape Number / c* WO^ 
Judge/Comm 
Clerk 
'4^0.(4^ 
iMQ 
Plaintiff Counsel 
Interpreter . 
CHARGES 
THE COURT SENTENCED THE DEFENDANT AS FOLLOWS 
—'wi ^w 
Defendant to Commence Serving Jail Sentence 
Defense Counsel. 
ended 
ded 
(1) Jail Suspended 
C>TS-
(2) FineAmt $ Susp. $ Fee$ A A V 
Payment Schedule: Pay $ 
(3) Court Costs $ 
per month/1 st Pmt Due 
TOTAL FINE(S) DUE $ 
Last Pmt. Due 
(4) Community Service/WP 
(5) Restitution $ 
Attorney Fees $ 
(6) Probation 
through 
Pay to Court L Victim r ] Show Proof to Court 
• Good Behavior • AP&P • ACEC • Other 
(7) Terms of probation: 
G No Further Violations 
• AA Meetings /wk / month 
• Counseling thru 
G Classes 
LJ Follow Program 
• No Alcohol 
G Antibuse 
G Employment 
• Proof of 
In/Out Treatment 
Health Testing 
Crime Lab Procedure 
• 
• 
(8) Plea in Abeyance/ Diversion 
(9) Review _ / / _ at _ 
In compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act, individuals 
needing special accommodations (including auxiliary communicative 
aids and services) during this proceeding should call Third District 
Court at 238-7391, at least three working days prior to the proceeding. 
APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITHIN 30 DAYS OF JUDGMENT 
^LO)A^ 
District Court Judge 
3lo 
ADDENDUM B 
76-2-102. Culpable mental state required — Strict li-
ability. 
Every offense not involving strict liability shall require a 
culpable mental state, and when the definition of the offense 
does not specify a culpable mental state and the offense does 
not involve strict liability, intent, knowledge, or recklessness 
shall suffice to establish criminal responsibility. An offense 
shall involve strict liability if the statute defining the offense 
clearly indicates a legislative purpose to impose criminal 
responsibiHty for commission of the conduct prohibited by the 
statute without requiring proof of any culpable mental state. 
1983, 
§ 76-5-107. Threat against life or property—Penalty 
(1) A person commits a threat against life or property if he threatens to commit any offense 
involving violence with intent to: 
(a) cause action of any nature by an official or volunteer agency organized to deal with 
emergencies; 
(b) place a person in fear of imminent serious bodily injury; or 
(c) prevent or interrupt the occupation of a building or room; place of assembly; place to 
which the public has access; or aircraft, automobile, or other form of transportation. 
(2) A threat against life or property is a class B misdemeanor, except if the actor's intent is 
to prevent or interrupt the occupation of a building, a place to which the public has access, or a 
facility of public transportation operated by a common carrier, the offense is a third degree 
felony. 
As last amended by Chapter 38, Laws of Utah 1988. 
§ 76-10-506. Threatening with or using dangerous weapon in fight or quarrel 
Every person, except those persons described in Section 76-10-503, who, not in necessary self 
defense in the presence of two or more persons, draws or exhibits any dangerous weapon in an angry 
and threatening manner or unlawfully uses the same in any fight or quarrel is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor. 
As last amended by Chapter 101, Laws of Utah 1992. 
§ 78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and to issue all 
writs and process necessary: 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of interlocutory 
appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings of state 
agencies or appeals from the district court review of informal adjudicative proceedings of the 
agencies, except the Public Service Commission, State Tax Commission, School and Institutional 
Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands actions reviewed by the 
executive director of the Department of Natural Resources, Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the 
state engineer; 
(b) appeals from the district court review of: 
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of the state or other local 
agencies; and 
(11) a challenge to agency action under Section 63-46a-12.1; 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts; 
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a 
charge of a first degree or capital felony; 
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a conviction of a 
first degree or capital felony; 
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by persons who are 
incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence, except petitions constituting a challenge to a 
conviction of or the sentence for a first degree or capital felony; 
(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs 
Rule 103. Rulings on evidence. 
(a) Effect of erroneous ruling. Error may not be predicated upon a ruling 
which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is 
affected, and 
(1) Objection. In case the ruling is one admitting evidence, a timely objection 
or motion to strike appears of record, stating the specific ground of objection, 
if the specific ground was not apparent from the context; or 
(2) Offer of proof In case the ruling is one excluding evidence, the substance 
of the evidence was made known to the court by offer or was apparent from the 
context within which questions were asked. 
(b) Record of offer and ruling. The court may add any other or further 
statement which shows the character of the evidence, the form in which it was 
offered, the objection made, and the ruling thereon. It may direct the making 
of an offer in question and answer form. 
(c) Hearing of jury. In jury cases, proceedings shall be conducted, to the 
extent practicable, so as to prevent inadmissible evidence from being sug-
gested to the jury by any means, such as making statements or offers of proof 
or asking questions in the hearing of the jury. 
(d) Plain error Nothing in this rule precludes taking notice of plain errors 
affecting substantial rights although they were not brought to the attention of 
the court. 
Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of 
prejudice, confusion, or waste of time. 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the 
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of 
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 
Rule 404. Character evidence not admissible to prove 
conduct; exceptions; other crimes. 
(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person's character or a trait 
of character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity 
therewith on a particular occasion, except: 
(1) Character of accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character offered by 
an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same; 
(2) Character of victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the 
victim of the crime offered by am accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the 
same, or evidence of a character trait of peaceftilness of the victim offered by 
the prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence that the victim was the 
first aggressor; 
(3) Character of witness. Evidence of the character of a witness, as provided 
in Rules 607, 608, and 609. 
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is 
not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in 
conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such 
as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, 
or absence of mistake or accident. In other words, evidence offered under this 
rule is admissible if it is relevant for a non-character purpose and meets the 
requirements of Rules 402 and 403. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992; February 11, 1998.) 
Rule 609. Impeachment by evidence of conviction of 
crime. 
(a) General rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, 
(1) evidence that a witness other than the accused has been convicted of a 
crime shall be admitted, subject to Rule 403, if the crime was punishable by 
death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which the 
witness was convicted, and evidence that an accused has been convicted of 
such a crime shall be admitted if the court determines that the probative value 
of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the accused; and 
(2) evidence that any witness has been convicted of a crime shall be 
admitted if it involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the 
punishment. 
(b) Time limit. Evidence of a conviction under this rule is not admissible if 
a period of more than ten years has elapsed since the date of the conviction or 
of the release of the witness from the confinement imposed for that conviction, 
whichever is the later date, unless the court determines, in the interests of 
justice, that the probative value of the conviction supported by specific facts 
and circumstances substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect. However, 
evidence of a conviction more than ten years old as calculated herein, is not 
admissible unless the proponent gives to the adverse party sufficient advance 
written notice of intent to use such evidence to provide the adverse party with 
a fair opportunity to contest the use of such evidence. 
(c) Effect of pardon, annulment, or certificate of rehabilitation. Evidence of a 
conviction is not admissible under this rule if (1) the conviction has been the 
subject of a pardon, annulment, certificate of rehabilitation, or other equiva-
lent procedure based on a finding of the rehabilitation of the person convicted, 
and that person has not been convicted of a subsequent crime which was 
punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year, or (2) the conviction 
has been the subject of a pardon, annulment, or other equivalent procedure 
based on a finding of innocence. 
(d) Juvenile adjudications. Evidence of juvenile adjudications is generally 
not admissible under this rule. The court may, however, in a criminal case 
allow evidence of a juvenile adjudication of a witness other than the accused if 
conviction of the offense would be admissible to attack the credibility of an 
adult and the court is satisfied that admission in evidence is necessary for a 
fair determination of the issue of guilt or innocence. 
(e) Pendency of appeal. The pendency of an appeal therefrom does not 
render evidence of a conviction inadmissible. Evidence of the pendency of an 
appeal is admissible. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.) 
